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Mobilising uncertainty and the making of
responsible sovereigns
TANJA E. AALBERTS AND WOUTER G. WERNER*
Abstract. The past few decades have witnessed a fundamental change in the perception of
threats to the security of states and individuals. Issues of security are no longer primarily
framed in terms of threats posed by an identifiable, conventional enemy. Instead, post-Cold
War security policies have emphasised the global and radically uncertain nature of threats
such as environmental degradation, terrorism and financial risks. What are the implications
of this transformation for one of the constitutive principles of international society: state
sovereignty? Existing literature has provided two possible answers to this question. The first
focuses on the alleged need for states to seek international cooperation and to relax claims
of national sovereignty. In Ulrich Beck’s terminology, this would amount to a transforma-
tion of sovereign states into ‘cosmopolitan states’. The second takes the opposite position:
in response to uncertain threats states rely on their sovereign prerogatives to take
exceptional measures and set aside provisions of positive law. In Beck’s terminology, this
would amount to the creation of a ‘surveillance state’. None of these two answers, however,
does justice to the complex relation between sovereignty, power and (international) law. As
this article will show, the invocation of radical uncertainty has led to a transformation in
sovereignty that cannot be captured in terms of the cosmopolitan/surveillance dichotomy.
What is at stake is a more fundamental transformation of the way in which sovereignty is
used to counter threats. Based on a study of the UN Counterterrorism Committee, this
article demonstrates how state sovereignty is used as a governmental technology that aims
to create proactive, responsible subjects.
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the security agenda by
changing perceptions of danger and threat. Whereas mainstream International
Relations (IR) theory analyses this caesura in terms of changing power structures
and the new security reality presented by a uni- or multipolar constellation, what
is even more telling is how this change of (in)security reveals epistemological
assumptions that underlie our understanding of danger, threats, and security. The
danger posed by the enemy can no longer be captured in terms of the precise
amount of warheads and the evaluation of the threats voiced by the enemy.
Rather, contemporary threats (especially global terrorism) are presented as
radically uncertain, as ‘unknown-unkowns’ that escape existing conventions,
norms, and risk-assessments. At the same there is a somewhat paradoxical
combination of, on the one hand, threats that are perceived as radically uncertain
and, on the other, a certainty that the threats are potentially catastrophic and
beyond repair. And because of the catastrophes that loom large, there is not time
for gathering knowledge to support our hunches, but we have to act now. Hence
the frequent resort to the precautionary principle in contemporary politics.
The imagery of radically uncertain, yet potentially catastrophic threats has
once more resulted in debates about one of the key constitutive principles of the
international society to date: state sovereignty. Scholars such as Beck have argued
that global terrorism has blurred traditional distinctions such as internal/external,
thereby rendering the nation-state ‘a zombie category’ within the emergent world
risk society.1 In the face of global threats such as terrorism or environmental
degradation, Beck argues, the concept of the state and its sovereignty must be
renegotiated, and be understood independently from previously dominant ideas
that linked sovereignty to autonomy.2 According to Beck, states should give up
exclusive claims for sovereignty and transform into cosmopolitan states, that seek
international cooperation, share sovereignty, and open up to the interests of the
world at large (global politics).3 Of course, with hindsight it is easy to criticise
Beck’s optimism about the transformations that could take place in international
politics. Many scholars have counterbalanced his vision about democratisation
and the cosmopolitan opportunities of world risk society by exposing its less
positive consequences in terms of imperial reinventions of liberty and democracy,
securitisation of diﬀerence, and notably the predominance of exceptional practices
beyond the law.4 Post 9/11 policies of targeted killing, preventative detention,
1 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited’, Theory, Culture & Society, 19
(2002), pp. 39–55 at p. 47. For a criticism of his application of zombie categories, see Mitchell Dean,
Governing Societies: Political Perspectives on Domestic and International Rule (Maidenhead: Open
University Press, 2007).
2 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 48.
3 Ibid., pp. 48, 50.
4 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, ‘Taming the Future: The Dispositif of Risk in the War on
Terror’, in Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede (eds), Risk and the War on Terror (London and
New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 23–40. See also Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005); Rens van Munster, ‘The War on Terrorism: When the Exception
Becomes the Rule’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 17 (2004), pp. 141–53; Jef
Huysmans, ‘International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception’,
Security Dialogue, 37 (2006), pp. 11–29; R. B. J. Walker, ‘Lines of Insecurity: International, Imperial,
Exceptional’, Security Dialogue, 37 (2006), pp. 65–82.
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anticipatory self-defence, or terrorist blacklisting indeed proved to be a far cry
from the open-minded, cosmopolitan spirit advocated by Beck. Instead, security
concerns trump civil and political rights while the rule of law is hollowed
out.5
We want to contribute in two ways to the ongoing discussion on world risk
society, terrorism, and sovereignty. Contra Beck, we argue that the disengagement
of sovereignty and autonomy is not unique to world risk society, but that
sovereignty has always implied a particular relationship between freedom and
responsibility. This argument is not based on a positivist account of the world
which reifies the statist paradigm and treats sovereign statehood as given and
ontologically prior to international community. On the contrary: we argue that
sovereignty is a dynamic concept that has always been used for the creation of
disciplined, responsible sovereign subjects within the international legal order.
Sovereignty can thus also be used as a tool to manage an uncertain future. Contra
many of Beck’s critics we argue that the fight against terrorism cannot be fully
grasped in terms of exceptional sovereign practices that transgress or suspend the
rule of law, both domestically and internationally. Law has played an important
role in the articulation and legitimation of policies that set out to forestall risks
that are perceived as uncertain and yet potentially catastrophic.6 On the one hand,
this indeed means it has repeatedly been politicised; transformed into an
instrument at the disposal of sovereign wills and national interests. On the other
hand, this article will show that in response to the 9/11 attacks, international law
has also been used to create institutional mechanisms that put states under an
obligation to adapt their legal systems in order to prevent possible terrorist
activities. In this light, it is quite understandable that it is possible to mobilise
uncertainty, not to bypass law and reinforce state autonomy, but to create legal
institutions that redefine what it means to be a sovereign state in an era of global
terrorism.
In order to substantiate our arguments, this article proceeds as follows. The
first section sets out the intrinsic relation between sovereignty and responsibility
within the international legal regime, arguing that one of the core functions of state
sovereignty has always been the creation of disciplined subjects who understand the
relation between freedom and responsibility. The second section discusses how the
rise of (perceived) global risks, such as environmental degradation and terrorism,
has aﬀected the way in which sovereigns can be held accountable. It shows how the
traditional (legal) regime of state responsibility has been supplemented and
supplanted by more managerial forms of accountability. One of the prime
examples of this development is the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) that was
created by the Security Council. The last part of the article discusses how this shift
in regulating practices builds on and transforms the traditional understanding of
sovereignty.
5 These practices rather fit Beck’s description of surveillance states, see Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’,
p. 49.
6 For insightful analyses of the transformation (rather than suspension) of law in Guantanamo Bay
as an exceptional space, see Fleur Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’,
European Journal of International Law, 16 (2005), pp. 613–35; and Claudia Aradau, ‘Law
Transformed: Guantanamo and the “Other” Exception’, Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007),
pp. 489–501.
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The nexus between sovereignty and responsibility
The concept of sovereignty is generally defined in terms of independence and
autonomy; as providing protection for the state’s freedom against outside
interferences.7 The emphasis on freedom and independence has led some authors
to conclude that sovereignty is essentially an anti-social concept, which is
antithetical to international accountability, world order, and international law.
Whereas this perspective might not seem surprising given the rationalist and
methodological individualism that have dominated the discipline of IR theory for
so long, similar readings of sovereignty as logical opposite to international legal
regimes also transpire within international law. Berman, for example, has argued
that ‘diﬀerent conceptions of international society result depending on whether,
and to what extent, law or sovereignty is granted ultimate primacy’.8 In a more
radical fashion, Cassese presents us with what seems to be a clear choice: ‘either
one supports the rule of law, or one supports State sovereignty’.9
Such individualistic or anti-social readings of state sovereignty, however, fail to
do justice to one of its crucial functions: the creation of responsible, disciplined
subjects in a society which lacks centralised mechanisms for legislation, adjudica-
tion, and enforcement.10 Take for example the classical usage of sovereignty as the
prerogative of states to declare and wage wars, which prevailed in (European)
international society roughly until the First World War.11 As the classical reading
puts the decision to declare and wage war exclusively in the hands of the sovereign,
it is easily misunderstood as the negation of the rule of law in international aﬀairs.
In reality the function of sovereignty was quite the opposite: it helped to transform
the religious and civil wars of the 16th century into international, regulated wars
between sovereign states.12 The importance of this transformation is illustrated,
inter alia, in the diﬀerence between the (at least formally) highly regulated land
wars between European sovereigns and the rather unregulated wars that European
sovereigns waged in colonial territories.13
Similarly, the notion of international legal personality was introduced by
Leibniz in the 17th century not to create a normatively free sphere in which states
could operate. On the contrary, the idea of the State as a sovereign legal person
was coined in an attempt to civilise power. More specifically, the concept of
international legal personality was advocated as a way to recognise the new power
configurations in Europe, and to bring the newly arising powers within an
7 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
See also the treatment of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case (Nicaragua vs. US
of America), Merits, ICJ Reports, 1986.
8 Nathaniel Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance, Self-Determination and International Law’, Wisconsin
International Law Journal, 7 (1986), pp. 390–443.
9 As quoted in Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 56.
10 Wouter G. Werner, ‘State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse’, in Ige F. Dekker and
Werner G. Werner (eds), Governance and International Legal Theory (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoﬀ,
2004), pp. 125–57.
11 For an analysis see Stephen Neﬀ, War and the Law of Nations. A General History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
12 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, Ware, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996); Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum
(New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006), Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum
Europaeum, trans. G. L. Ulmen of Carl Schmitt (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1950).
13 Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth.
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overarching normative structure. Through the assignment of a specific, privileged
status, the normative order constituted its own sovereign subjects and presented
them as the principal bearers of international responsibility. As Nijman has argued:
‘. . . the concept of international legal personality functioned to rationalize the
participation of the German Princes in international life, but by the same legal
move established their responsibility to conform to the justice-based rules of the law
of nations’.14 Contrary to the chronicles that equate sovereignty (at least prior to
the globalisation age) with autonomy,15 from its very inception in modern
international law sovereignty thus meant having a certain identity, which came
with rights and duties and responsibilities. This was reconfirmed in one of the
landmark rulings on sovereignty in the twentieth century: the Island of Palmas
case. In this case, arbiter Huber made the relation between sovereignty and
responsibility the core of his argument, claiming that territorial sovereignty not
only gives states the right to exercise jurisdiction over their territories, but also puts
them under an obligation to respect the rights of other states.16
The nexus between sovereignty and responsibility further materialised in the
post 1945 international society as well as in the international legal order. As the
International Law Commission argued, ‘If it is the prerogative of sovereignty to be
able to assert its rights, the counterpart of that prerogative is the duty to discharge
its obligations.’17 The link between sovereignty and responsibility became even
more important in light of the growing importance of so called ‘community
interests’, that is, interests that ‘go far beyond the interests held by States as such;
rather, they correspond to the needs, hopes and fears of all human beings, and
attempt to cope with problems the solution of which may be decisive for the
survival of entire humankind’.18 Community interests can be found, inter alia, in
the sphere of international environmental law, human rights, as well as inter-
national peace and security.19 Whereas community interests previously connoted
14 Janne Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality. An Inquiry into the History and
Theory of International Law (The Hague: T. C. M. Asser, 2004), p. 499, emphasis added.
15 Beck’s argument relies on a similar reading of sovereignty as autonomy, see Beck, ‘The Terrorist
Threat’.
16 As the Huber put it: ‘Territorial sovereignty . . . involves the exclusive right to display the activities
of a State. This right has as a corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the
rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and war, together
with the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory’ (Island of Palmas
case (Netherlands vs. US), RIAA II 829, 1928). See also the award in the Spanish Zones of Morocco
claims case (Britain vs. Spain), 2 RIAA 615, 1925, p. 641 (‘[R]esponsibility is the necessary corollary
of a right. All rights of an international character involve international responsibility’); and the
separate opinion of Judge Séfériadès in the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos case (France vs. Greece),
PCIJ Series A/B no. 62, 1937, p. 45.
17 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1973, II, p. 177.
18 Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’, Recueil des Cours,
250 (1994), pp. 217–384, at pp. 233, 244. See also Cassese’s characterisation of ‘community
obligations’ as obligations possessing the following features: ‘(i) they are obligations protecting
fundamental values . . .; (ii) they are obligations erga omnes . . .; (iii) they are attended by a
correlative right that belongs to any State (or to any other contracting State, in case of obligations
provided for in multilateral treaties; (iv) this right may be excercised by any other (contracting) State,
whether or not it has been materially or morally injured by the violation; (v) the right is exercised
on behalf of the whole international community (or the community of contracting States) to safeguard
fundamental values of this community’ (Antonio Cassesse, International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), p. 16, emphasis in original.
19 By now, there is a rich body of literature on ‘community interests’ in international law For an
overview see, inter alia, Jost Delbruck (ed.), New Trends in International Lawmaking. International
‘Legislation’ In the Public Interest (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1997).
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foremost issues of so-called soft politics, the attacks on the Twin Towers have
broadened its agenda to security issues and high politics. In Beck’s cosmopolitan
visionary: ‘People have often asked: “What could unite the world?” And the
answer sometimes given is: “An attack from Mars.” In a sense, that was just what
happened on September 11th: an attack from our “inner Mars”. It worked as
predicted. For some time, at least, the warring camps and nations of the world
united against the common foe of global terrorism.’20 And an important lesson to
be drawn, in his view, is that it has turned security into a transnational issue that
moves beyond national sovereignty, in other words: a community interest.
At first sight, it seems as if community interests challenge the traditional idea
of state sovereignty as they transcend the interests and autonomy of individual
states.21 However, given the absence of a centralised body that creates and enforces
rules, sovereign states still play a pivotal role in the articulation and realisation of
community interests. A good example can be found in the sphere of environmental
law, which defines certain issues as problems of ‘common concern’ or as ‘concern
to humankind’.22 The concept of ‘common concern’ assigns special responsibilities
to sovereign states:
[It] leaves existing jurisdictional regimes intact, be it sovereignty over territory and the
territorial sea, sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone, or flag state or state of
registry jurisdiction in the global commons. It requires that states within their territory and
over activities subject to their jurisdiction adopt measures to curtail environmental
degradation and that states assist each other in addressing such degradation.23
In similar fashion, community interests such as the protection of human rights
require rather than undermine responsible, sovereign states, as was confirmed in
redefinition of sovereignty in the Responsibility to Protect paradigm.24
20 Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 26.
21 Indeed, Beck calls for releasing the link between sovereignty and autonomy: ‘In this context, then,
a new central distinction emerges between sovereignty and autonomy. The nation-state is built on
equating the two. So from the nation-state perspective, economic interdependence, cultural
diversification and military, judicial and technological cooperation all lead to a loss of autonomy and
thus sovereignty. But if sovereignty is measured in terms of political clout – that is, by the extent
to which a country is capable of having an impact on the world stage, and of furthering the security
and wellbeing of its people by bringing its judgements to bear – then it is possible to conceive the
same situation very diﬀerently. In the latter framework, increasing interdependence and cooperation,
that is, a decrease in autonomy, can lead to an increase in sovereignty. Thus, sharing sovereignty
does not reduce it; on the contrary, sharing actually enhances it. This is what cosmopolitan
sovereignty means in the era of world risk society.’ (Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, pp. 48–9). This line
of argument seems to resonate in familiar discussions on the possibility of cooperation, integration
and pooling of sovereignty between sovereign states within neoliberal institutionalist approaches. See
inter alia Robert O. Keohane, ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The EU and the US’, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 40 (2002), pp. 743–65.
22 Examples can be found in the preambles of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, or the 1992
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
23 Ellen Hey, ‘Global Environmental Law and Global Institutions, A System Lacking “Good Process”’,
in Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner (eds), Cosmopolitanism in Context. Perspectives from
International Law and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) (in print).
Text on file with authors.
24 Whereas we argue that the link between sovereignty and responsibility is not a late-twentieth century
invention (as the controversy surrounding the Responsibility to Protect paradigm suggests), there has
been a shift in what this sovereign responsibility entails: from respecting the rights of fellow-
sovereigns (Island of Palmas) to protecting human rights of one’s citizens (Responsibility to Protect)
to community interests at large. See also Tanja E. Aalberts and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Sovereignty
Beyond Borders: Sovereignty, Self-Defense and the Disciplining of States’, in Rebecca Adler-Nissen
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The protection of community interests, like the attempts to create order and
stability through the recognition of responsible sovereigns in the 17th century, thus
still heavily depends on the functioning of disciplined, sovereign states that can be
held accountable for the way in which they use their freedom. Sovereignty, hence,
is not a given identity of states, ontologically prior to the development of the
international community and autonomous from the legal order. Rather, it connotes
in post-structuralist terms ‘subjectivity’ (subject-hood). Here a parallel can be
drawn with the notion of international legal personality.25 Just as subjects in
international law, including sovereign states, are defined by the institutional
framework and the rights and duties that are attached to their status as
international legal persons at a given moment of time, so does the notion of
subjectivity (subject-hood) refer to the construction of the subject within the
discourse or social order, as opposed to the assumption of the subject as given and
complete (sovereign) identity by itself. Parallel to the legal link between inter-
national personality and (sovereign) status on the one hand, and rights and duties
that provide its substance on the other,26 ‘subjectivity’ refers to the relation
between rights and identity, both in terms of empowerment, agency and freedom
(establishing a sovereign status), and in terms of substantiating this by the
imposition of a norm of ‘being’ (and/or sovereign rights and duties). In
Foucaultian terms: subjectivity entails an ‘ambiguous position as an object of
knowledge and as a subject that knows’.27 In other words, in addition to the
traditional conception of states as bearers of power and authority in the
international realm, one should address how they themselves are subject to
international protocols and regimes of knowledge that empower them as subjects.28
Conceiving sovereignty as subjectivity, and more specifically as a way to
organise international responsibility, a continuity transpires between attempts in
the 17th century to create stability and order through the recognition of
responsible sovereigns and recent attempts to transform sovereign states into
guardians of common interests that aﬀect mankind as a whole. The shift in world
risk society in terms of relinquishing the alleged traditional bond of sovereignty
and autonomy is then less revolutionary than Beck would have us believe.29
However, as we will set out in the next section, the rise of community interests,
increasingly defined in terms of new types of threat and radical uncertainty, also
signified an important discontinuity: it has aﬀected the specific institutional ways
in which states are called to account, and hence the manifestation of sovereign
subjectivity.
and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), Sovereignty Games. Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in
Europe and Beyond (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 129–50.
25 Tanja E. Aalberts, Constructing Sovereignty Between Politics and Law (London: Routledge, 2012).
26 As Koskenniemi puts it: from the status of sovereign statehood itself no ‘given, determin-
ate, normative implications’ follow Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Future of Statehood’, Harvard
International Law Journal, 32 (1991), pp. 397–410, 408.
27 Michael Foucault, The Order of Things (Harvester Press, 1989), p. 312, quoted by Michael Dillon,
‘Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of The “New World Order” To the
Ethical Problematic of the World Order’, Alternatives, 20 (1995), pp. 323–68, 324.
28 See also Dillon, ‘Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of The “New World
Order” To the Ethical Problematic of the World Order’; Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’.
29 Nevertheless, his concern seems to be quite similar to 17th century scholars and lawyers, namely ‘if
the world is to survive this century, it must find a way to civilize world risk society. A new big idea
is wanted. I suggest the idea of the cosmopolitan state, founded upon the recognition of the otherness
of the other’ (Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat’, p. 50).
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The changing ways in which states are called to account
State responsibility
The traditional way in which states are called to account for wrongful behaviour
is through the invocation of their formal responsibility. In August 2001 the
International Law Commission laid down the most important rules on state
responsibility in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts.30 Most of the articles adopted by the Commission reflect
provisions of customary international law.31 The articles set out how and under
what conditions a state is to be held responsible for a breach of international law
and determine what consequences follow from such a breach.32 For the purposes
of this article, two features of the articles on state responsibility deserve special
attention.
In the first place, the articles link past, present, and future in a particular way.
The rules on state responsibility are only applicable when it is possible to define
existing undesired events as injuries of a state that are the result of past wrongful
behaviour of another state. In this sense, the articles are backward-looking: they
link existing injuries to preceding illegalities. At the same time, the articles contain
obligations that aim to guide future (and present) conduct of the wrongdoing state.
The latter is under an obligation to cease the wrongful act to give, if necessary,
assurances, and guarantees of non-repetition33 and to ‘repair’ the injuries of
another state. The articles on State responsibility thus place the occurrence of
undesired events in a bigger narrative of normalcy, disruption, and restoration. Its
aim is to put things back in order; to restore the integrity of the norm, of
norm-alcy. As Brownlie puts it: ‘The question of responsibility is, in practical
terms, a matter of insistence on performance or restoration of normal standards of
international conduct.’34
In the second place, the articles on state responsibility are, by their very nature,
state-centric. The rules of state responsibility only apply when wrongful behaviour
can be attributed to a state (because it conducted, controlled, or adopted such
behaviour)35 or when a state failed to take appropriate measures to prevent illegal
conduct by others.36 In addition, the responsibility of a wrongdoing state needs to
30 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC
on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Session, Supp No 10, p. 43, UN Doc
A/56/10 (2001). See also Resolution 56/83 (12 December 2001) through which the UN General
Assembly ‘commended [the articles] to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the
question of their future adoption or other appropriate action’.
31 For an overview see James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility-Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
32 Commentaries on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53d session (2001), p. 59. Available at:
{www.un.org/law} accessed on 7 August 2009.
33 For an expression of this obligation see, inter alia, La Grand (Germany vs. US of America), Merits,
Judgement of 27 June 2001.
34 Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations, State Responsibility (Part I) (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983), p. 22.
35 See chapter II of the ILC articles, supra note 32.
36 The classical case regarding the so called ‘due diligence’ or ‘due care’ obligations of a state is the
US Diplomatic and Consular Staﬀ in Teheran (US of America vs. Iran), 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports,
1980.
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be invoked by an injured state. In this context, the term ‘invocation’ is reserved for
relatively formal measures such as the presentation of a formal claim against the
wrongdoing state or the commencement of judicial proceedings.
Both the backward-looking and the state-centric nature of state responsibility
are diﬃcult to square with the way in which some security issues have been framed
in the post-9/11 era. As was set out in the introduction, security issues have
increasingly been defined in terms of uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats
against community interests – very much like dangers to the global environment
have been presented since the late 1980s. While states remain pivotal in tackling
such threats, the institutional framework of eﬀectuating the responsibility of states
has proven to be far from perfect. In areas such as the protection of the global
environment it has proven to be diﬃcult to govern behaviour in terms of the
formal invocation of the responsibility of a wrongdoing state. The legal regime of
state responsibility often fails for (a combination of) diﬀerent reasons: it is not
always possible to attribute harmful conduct to a state; it is sometimes diﬃcult to
establish a causal relation between wrongful behaviour and damage; the formal
invocation of responsibility might be problematic for diplomatic reasons; and the
rules of state responsibility do not take suﬃcient account of the capabilities of
states to live up to their international obligations.37 Not surprisingly, therefore,
states have been rather reluctant to rely exclusively on the formal rules of state
responsibility in international environmental practice as well as international
terrorism.38 The shortcomings of state responsibility have led to several alternative,
or supplementary, ways of holding states accountable under international law. One
such alternative is the creation of institutional mechanisms that try to actively
engage states in a common eﬀort to forestall potentially catastrophic threats: the
so-called non-compliance procedures. The development of non-compliance proce-
dures is an example of the so called ‘managerial turn’ in (international) law and
policy. Increasingly, formal rules and traditional forms of responsibility are
supplemented or replaced by more informal, managerial forms of accountability.39
While these mechanisms leave more room for flexibility, they also raise concerns
about the defomalisation of international law and the increased possibilities to use
international law as a mere policy instrument. In the next section we will spell out
in more detail how this managerial turn has taken place in the area of
counter-terrorism and how this has aﬀected our understanding of the nature and
function of state sovereignty.
Non-compliance procedures and sovereign responsibility
The shift towards more active forms of responsibility has materialised most
significantly in non-compliance procedures. In this alternative form to organise
37 See Jutta Brunnée, ‘International Legal Accountability through the Lens of the Law of State
Responsibility’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 36 (2005), pp. 3–38.
38 This does not mean that the traditional doctrine of state responsibility has become completely
obsolete. It has played a key role, for instance, in the legitimation of the war in Afghanistan. See
Aalberts and Werner, ‘Sovereignty Beyond Borders’.
39 See also Kessler’s distinction between law as a ‘system of norms’ versus law as ‘manager of
uncertainty’, this special section.
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state responsibility, states are called to account for their behaviour with regard to
particular issues of community interest in a procedure constituted by international
law. They have been aptly described as the ‘middle way between diplomacy and
law’.40 These procedures are legal in the sense that they are established and
regulated by international treaties. They are diplomatic in the sense that they leave
much more room for negotiation, adjustment and cooperation than the traditional
rules of state responsibility that are formulated in a law enforcement mode.
The ‘compliance shift’ originates from the environmental regime.41 In response
to the relative ineﬀectiveness of the rules of state responsibility several environ-
mental treaties developed specific procedures to ensure compliance with its
substantive obligations. Since the 1990s international environmental law has thus
witnessed a proliferation of treaty-specific monitoring bodies entrusted with the
tasks of preventing non-compliance, assisting states to comply with their inter-
national obligations, responding to non-compliance and facilitating further
decision-making relating to non-compliance.42
Whereas they both aim to regulate responsibility and accountability amongst
sovereign members, non-compliance procedures diﬀer significantly from the
invocation of State responsibility as discussed in the previous section. The
traditional rules on state responsibility are essentially confrontational as they
require an injured state to formally invoke the responsibility of another, suppos-
edly wrongdoing state. As described above, non-compliance procedures are much
more ‘managerial’ or administrative: their aim is to enhance international
cooperation for what is perceived to be the common good. Thus, rather than
invoking juridical procedures, judgements of responsibility are transferred to the
administrative sphere. State parties are generally required to file reports on their
compliance to an independent committee. When a state party fails to meet its
obligations under the treaty, the result is not a formal invocation of their
responsibility, but rather the start of a dialogue on the possible causes, the
proposal of possible improvements and maybe even the oﬀering of technical
assistance, thus assuming a lack of capacity as cause for the non-compliance, rather
than intentional fault or lack of will. Only if a state persists in non-compliance with
40 Maas Goote, ‘Non-Compliance Procedures in International Environmental Law: The Middle Way
between Diplomacy and Law’, International Law Forum, 1 (1999), pp. 82–9, 82.
41 For an extensive discussion of non-compliance procedures in international environmental law see
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the
Montreal Protocol’, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 3 (1992), pp. 123–62; Jacob
Werksman, ‘Compliance and the Kyoto Protocol: Building a Backbone into a “Flexible” Regime’,
Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 9 (1998), pp. 48–105; Malgosia Fitzmaurice
and Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law’,
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 31 (2000), pp. 35–65; Robin R. Churchill and Geir
Ulfstein ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A
Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’, The American Journal of International Law, 49
(2000), pp. 623–59.
42 Examples can be found in the Montreal protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal and the UN Framework on
Climate Change. See also Goote, ‘Non-Compliance Procedures’, p. 85. A relatively recent example
of such a mechanism is the Compliance Committee that was established under the Aarhus
Convention. Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Publics Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, available at: {http://www.unece.org/env/
pp/documents/cep43e.pdf} accessed on 18 August 2009.
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treaty obligations will the committee use confrontational methods such as naming,
shaming, and suspension of rights.
Within the post-9/11 context it is not surprising that this shift to managerial
forms of accountability is extended from environmental issues to terrorism. As
policy areas, environmental issues and global terrorism share a number of
characteristics.43 Both can be characterised as ‘global’ problems par excellence.
They do not respect territorial boundaries and hence do not fit the current system
of sovereign states and the demarcation of domestic from international aﬀairs very
well. Irrespective of the particular territory or jurisdiction in which an undesired
event takes place, with the environment and global terrorism there is no real
demarcation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and the distinction between domestic and
foreign aﬀairs dissolves. As common problems they do not fit ‘sovereign solutions’
in the Westphalian sense of cuius regio, eius religio; rather as a community interest
they require combined eﬀorts by the international community at large. Moreover,
both environmental issues and global terrorism are perceived as uncertain risks,
having potentially catastrophic consequences. Whereas for the environment these
are still considered to be longer term problems for future generations, 9/11 has
been perceived as an example of an instant catastrophic event. The political
imaginary of uncertain yet undeniable catastrophe has informed the shift to a
precautionary logic as an alternative way to master the risk of terror.44 Responsible
behaviour is now informed by proactivity and taking precautions for the
preservation of international order and common good.
This imagery also informed the adoption of Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 1373 (2001), a resolution which was characterised as the ‘cornerstone of the
United Nation’s counter terrorism eﬀort’45 as well as the ‘centre of global eﬀorts
to fight against terrorism’.46 Resolution 1373 puts states under far-reaching
obligations to eﬀectively combat terrorism within their respective sovereign
jurisdictions.47 States are required to ensure that their domestic legal systems are
capable of preventing the commission and financing of terrorist activities and to
43 For a discussion of the diﬀerences between environmental, financial and terrorist risks, see Beck,
‘The Terrorist Threat’.
44 Aradau and Van Munster, ‘Taming the Future’; Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of
Catastrophe. Genealogies of the Unknown (London, Routledge, 2011), in print. The precautionary
principle was oﬃcially adopted by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration reads: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-eﬀective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ Since then, it has been
established in a variety of treaties and declarations. For an overview see, inter alia Arie Trouwborst,
Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 2006).
45 Eric Rosand, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight
against Terrorism’, American Journal of International Law, 97 (2003), pp. 333–41, 333.
46 Secretary General Kofi Annan’s statement in the ministrial meeting of the Security Council,
Doc.S/PV.4688, 20 January 2003, p. 2.
47 Resolution 1373 has been characterised as ‘first-ever legislative act’ of the Security Council, on the
basis of its discretionary powers according to article 25 en Chapter VII of the Charter: a decision
that is legally binding and enforceable upon all member-states indefinitely, and that is broad in its
scope. See Paul Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’, American Journal of International
Law, 96 (2002), pp. 901–5; José E. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, American
Journal of International Law, 97 (2002), pp. 873–88; Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World
Legislature’, American Journal of International Law, 99 (2005), pp. 175–93; Kendall W. Stiles, ‘The
Power of Procedures and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the UN’, Journal of
Peace Research, 43 (2006), pp. 37–54, 46.
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ensure that those responsible for terrorist activities are brought to justice.
Moreover, Resolution 1373 obliges states to facilitate international cooperation
and calls upon states to exchange information, become party to anti-terrorist
conventions, scrutinise their asylum policies and implement their international
obligations. Resolution 1373, in short, aims at disciplining the legislative and
executive machinery of the states worldwide. In that sense, it is a prime example
of the blurring of the internal-international divide discussed by Beck.
The formulation of the Resolution shows a clear shift towards the prevention
of terrorism and towards the cooperation and exchange of information (early
warning) between member-states in their combat against transnational terrorism.
This is a palpable move away from (post-)Cold War anti-terror strategies that the
Security Council adopted up until the 9/11 attacks. Not only had it treated
terrorism as foremost internal or interstate conflicts, its anti-terror strategy was
characterised by a mandatory sanctions regime against state-sponsored terrorism,
such as for instance implemented against Libya, Sudan and the Taliban.48 Now,
rather than having merely a ‘duty to refrain’,49 member-states are made responsible
for taking precautions so that their country is free from any possible future
terrorist activity.
In order to monitor the implementation of the obligations contained in
Resolution 1373, it also created a specialised committee, the so called Counter-
Terrorism Committee.50 When the CTC was established, US governmental oﬃcials
regarded it as an instrument to globalise the US counterterrorism legislation,
especially the Patriot Act.51 Resolution 1373 was indeed drafted by the US
government, which also highly supported its implementation. While formally the
CTC was backed by strong legal and political powers, in practice, however, the
CTC has taken great pains to distance itself from any adversarial or confronta-
tional attitude towards member states. Time and again, the CTC emphasised that
it is not a sanction committee and has no intention whatsoever to condemn or
pressure states.52 Starting from the principle of sovereignty equality, it takes into
account that states have diﬀerent levels of capacity to eﬀectively fight terrorism and
have sought to assist rather than criticise states that lagged behind in the
48 Respectively UNSC Resolution 748 (1992), Resolution 1054 (1996), and Resolutions 1267 (1999),
1333 (2000) and 1363 (2001).
49 UNSC Resolution 1189 (13 August 1998).
50 By now, the CTC consists of three layers: the Plenary, the Bureau and the CTED. The Plenary
consists of representatives of the fifteen member States of the Security Council. It has the primary
responsibility for setting priorities in promoting and monitoring the implementation of Resolution
1373, communicating problems to the Security Council and facilitating contacts between the CTC
and other UN bodies as well as other international organisations, considering initiatives for technical
assistance and approving of the CTED work programme. The Bureau consists of the chair and the
three vice chairs and is responsible for dealing promptly with issues that could be reported to the
Plenary for confirmation as well as for harmonising the work of the subcommittees that deal with
State reports on implementation. The CTED consists of experts who play a pivotal role in, inter alia,
overseeing the implementation of Resolution 1373, setting up dialogues with states, facilitating
capacity building and cooperating and communicating with UN bodies and other international
organisations. For a detailed overview of the tasks and responsibilities of the diﬀerent branches of
the CTC see: {http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/} accessed 15 October 2008.
51 Serge Schmemann, ‘UN to Get a US Antiterror Guide’, New York Times (19 December 2001). See
also the US report on Resolution 1373 to the Security Council, available at: {http://www.state.gov/
p/io/rls/rpt/2001/6917.htm}.
52 See, for example, the comments of chairman Greenstock at the 57th Security Council session (4/8
October 2002), S/PV.4618, p. 5.
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implementation of Resolution 1373.53 The CTC seeks to create an image based on
concepts such as transparency, dialogue, and consensus instead of sanctions,
coercion, and confrontation. Its main activities consist of reviewing country
reports, facilitating technical assistance, fostering international cooperation,
encouraging states to sign up to international conventions, and dissemination of
best practices. The shift to compliance procedures illustrates this reliance on
precaution, yet also reveals the precaution paradox: Whereas one of the defining
elements of precaution is that we need to act in the face of radical uncertainty and
impossibility of reliable knowledge, it is accompanied by a wish to collect as much
information as possible.54 In its urge for data, the language used by the CTC is far
more administrative, technical, and bureaucratic, more managerial than political. It
is about committees and subcommittees, accountability mechanisms, terms of
review, and numerous abbreviations. However, as we will argue below, this
administrative endeavour should not distract from the fact that the CTC project is
in fact highly political, not in the least through the very mechanisms that are
applied. In fact, the more managerial approach advocated by the CTC makes it
easier to use international law as an instrument to govern the international society
of states.
Sovereignty, and governmentality
Non-compliance procedures thus give renewed meaning to the intrinsic relation
between sovereignty, freedom, and responsibility that has always existed under
international law. They can be considered as an attempt to institutionally embed
the focus on the future and the community interest. In that sense they seem to fit
the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in the IR globalisation literature. As
opposed to notions of unilateral power, centralised authority, command, and
coercion that characterise the workings of ‘government’, governance ‘refers to
activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and
formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police
powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance’.55 The emphasis hence is on
the linkages between formally equal members of the international society (networks
of interdependence), who cooperate to deal with shared problems, without relying
on centralised, hierarchical, and coercive authority structures to create inter-
national order. Thus the non-confrontational workings of compliance committees,
based on sovereignty equality and cooperation in combination with managerial
53 The CTC distinguishes between three phases. In stage A the focus is on the appropriate legislation
that should be in place. Stage B focuses on the existence of an eﬀective executive machinery,
coordination, and mechanisms for counterterrorist activity and cooperation at the bilateral, regional,
and global level. Stage C deals with bringing terrorists and their supporters to justice via the
legislation and the executive machinery established in the earlier stages.
54 Marjolein van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox’,
Journal of Risk Research, 9 (2006), pp. 313–36.
55 James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in James N. Rosenau and
Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1–29, at p. 4.
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compliance strategies, seems to fit the governance agenda quite well.56 Apart from
the unprecedented rule-setting measures by the Security Council, the implementa-
tion of the UN counterterrorist strategy then represents an equalising move away
from hierarchical modes of government, and an attempt at taming power relations
by cooperating in the pursuit of a shared interest regarding a transnational
problem. In this light, governance is conceived as rescuing the international
community from ‘sovereignty’s worst instincts’.57 At the same time, to the extent
that governance pertains to a voluntary act of sovereign states to cooperate in
common regimes to address transnational problems, it can be conceived as a
reconfirmation of their sovereign status.58 This indeed seems to come close to
Beck’s democratising and cosmopolitan vision of world risk society.
However, the preceding discussion of the changing nature of state responsibility
within legal discourse suggests that something else is at stake, which pertains to the
intricate relationship between politics and law, and the workings of sovereign
equality as liberal foundation of the international society. In this regard non-
compliance procedures supplement the age-old attempts of international law to
create free, yet disciplined and responsible sovereigns. Proactive responsibility and
compliance procedures then entail more than an increasing legalisation of
international society in a liberal governance mode. Rather, the ‘thickening’ of the
international realm involves a transformation of the logic of politics and the
functioning of power itself in relation to member-states as subjects of international
society.59 Crucially, this functioning of power is not separate from the legal realm
but part and parcel of the manifestation of sovereign subjectivity as it is embedded
in international protocols and regimes of knowledge that empower states as actors
in the international realm. This is the result of what Foucault identifies as
productive power. In juxtaposition to the traditional conception of power as
‘excluding’, ‘repressive’, and ‘censoring’, Foucault emphasises its constitutive side:
‘[P]ower produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals
of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to
this production.’60
Crucially, productive power does not rely on a hierarchical and coercive
domination of a ruler over its subjects, but derives from heterogeneous practices of
56 Monika Heupel, ‘Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving
Approach to Terrorism’, Security Dialogue, 38 (2007), pp. 477–99; Monika Heupel, ‘Combining
Hierarchical and Soft Modes of Governance, The Un Security Council’s Approach to Terrorism and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation after 9/11’, Cooperation and Conflict, 53 (2008), pp.
7–29.
57 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 1.
58 This was explicitly stated in the Wimbledon Case (1923), which dealt with the restriction of sovereign
freedom due to treaty making. This, however, is not a forsaking of (the status of) sovereignty but
rather part of its exercise, as the Permanent Court famously stated: ‘No doubt any convention
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign right of the
State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering
into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty’ (S. S. Wimbledon Case, PCIJ
Series A, No.1, 1923, p. 25).
59 Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, ‘The International as Governmentality’, Millennium, 35
(2007), pp. 677–701.
60 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 194;
cf. Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews
and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), pp. 109–33, 119.
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power within society. Thus productive power is characterised not by mechanisms
of coercion or punishment, but typically works through self-government, rating,
and ranking of performances, surveillance and control within a system of formal
equality and autonomy. In the case of the CTC this pertains to assessment of
performances of individual member-states in the execution of the UN anti-terror
strategy within their jurisdiction in order to establish a community of responsible
sovereigns. This is what Foucault refers to as governmentality, defined as the
‘conduct of conduct’, or ‘the art of government’: ‘a form of activity aiming to
shape, guide or aﬀect the conduct of some person[s]’ with the aim of the promotion
of the common good.61 Translated to the international society, it does not only
consist of subjects with individual wishes and inspirations, but sovereign statehood
concurrently is an object of government that needs to be ordered for the pursuit
of common concerns. Also described as ‘the right disposition of things . . . to a
convenient end’62 governmentality at once entails a rationalisation of governance
that can be conceived as a ‘managerial activity’: ‘arranging things wisely in order
to maximize outputs in specific fields of application’.63
With the modus operandi of governmentality being knowledge, examination,
and control of subjects (rather than coercive power and punishment), law performs
a diﬀerent function within this regime of power.Whereas traditionally law is
conceived in terms of rules of constraint within a formal juridical structure, a
governmental perspective draws attention to its productive function.64 Relating this
double function of law to the institution of sovereignty it pinpoints beyond a
traditional conception in terms of sovereign rights (of non-intervention, self-
defence and non-intervention) per se, to the (productive) power of the Norm. This
hence leads to an alternative reading of the notion of ‘rights’ and sovereignty as
autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre. From a governmentality perspective the
focus thus shifts from the agency, authority, and legitimacy that rights create, to
mechanisms of subjectivation that are generated by a particular rights regime.
Consequently, such a perspective discloses the interconnection between legal status
and rights beyond the legal perspective of rights as a package deal or attribute to
personality, to the impact of rights in constituting the very personality. Accord-
ingly, it qualifies the common notion of sovereign individuality qua freedom and
autonomy by addressing the production of legitimate forms of being (subjectivity)
and responsibility instead.
Two issues follow from this. For one thing, distinguishing between the juridical
system of the law, and the operation of law as a Norm beyond established judicial
institutions,65 law thus can be conceptualised as a tactic or technology of
government, as a way of ordering things and people.66 This functioning of law
61 Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’, in Graham Burchell et al., (eds),
The Foucault Eﬀect. Studies in Governmentality (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 1–52, 2.
62 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in Graham Burchell et al., (eds), The Foucault Eﬀect. Studies
in Governmentality (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87–105, 94.
63 Laura Zanotti, ‘Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The Un Debate on
Democratization and Good Governance’, Alternatives, 30 (2005), pp. 461–87, 463.
64 François Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’, Representations, 30 (1990), pp. 138–61; Aalberts,
Constructing Sovereignty Between Politics and Law.
65 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction (New York, 1979); Ewald,
‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’.
66 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, p. 95.
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transpires clearly in the shift towards proactive forms of state responsibility and the
compliance regime as discussed in the previous section. This relates to a second
point: whereas subjectivity qualifies the liberal notion of absolute autonomy and
freedom as the natural condition of individual beings, freedom, and agency are
indeed a crucial condition for the working of governmentality. To put it diﬀerently,
as a non-coercive form of power, productive power operates through the modality
of freedom and agency, which is both an end and a means for governing:
‘Governing is performed through autonomous subjects, not on passive objects.’67
Liberal governance can then be conceptualised as a particular governmental logic
that operates by shaping and fostering autonomous and responsible individuals
(states) for the protection of the (international) community through a collection of
‘governmental techniques’, including setting standards for appropriate, eﬀective,
and legitimate behaviour for individual subjects and examining their performances
accordingly.
Thus, governmentality works towards the improvement of respective popula-
tions, as well as structuring their possible field of action’ in order to produce
visible, responsible and predictable actors.68 In terms of the preceding discussion
on the legal link between sovereignty and responsibility, in governmental terms this
hence pertains to the exercise of sovereign freedom in a responsible and disciplined
fashion – ‘in order to act freely, the subject must first be shaped, guided and
moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom’.69 This shaping,
guiding, and moulding is increasingly practiced through compliance regimes that
reinforce the exercise of a sovereign status of autonomy and liberty through
rational normalised conduct. Crucially, this entails a shift from State responsibility
in terms of ex post facto attribution and reparation for wrongful behaviour,
towards responsible behaving of individual subjects by taking precautions against
possible future threats within world risk society. As executive body of the UN
counterterror strategy the CTC has thus set clear standards what responsible
exercise of sovereignty entails in this regard, and closely monitors member-states’
performances accordingly.
Moreover, from a governmental perspective this responsibilisation of sovereign
subjectivity on the one hand constitutes states as capable actors that bear
responsibility for their policy choices (for example, countering terrorist activities
within their respective territories) and on the other hand projects them as objects
of examination and regulation (for example, ranking their performances in terms
of the UN anti-terror strategy) on the basis of their very identity as sovereign
members of the international society. This is further exemplified in terms of the
particular measures taken in case of under-performance. As opposed to traditional
legal notions of state responsibility, within its compliance regime the CTC
acknowledges diﬀerences in state capabilities. Rather than insisting on ‘reparations’
in case a state fails to live up to its obligations, the committee provides advice and
technical assistance in order to enable states to better themselves and improving
67 Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs,
States, and Power’, International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006), pp. 651–72, at 696. See also Mitchell
Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999).
68 Neumann and Sending, ‘International as Governmentality’; and Zanotti, ‘Governmentalizing the
Post-Cold War International Regime’, p. 471.
69 Dean Governmentality, p. 165.
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state capabilities. Thus the particular regime of government displayed by the CTC,
focusing on sovereign equality of member-states, reinforces the responsibilisation of
sovereignty. States are constituted as ethical actors responsible and deemed capable
not only for safeguarding sovereign rights of fellow-states (as is key to the Island
of Palmas ruling), and protecting their own citizens (as reflected in the Responsi-
bility to Protect paradigm), but also for taking precautions against transnational
terrorism within their jurisdiction. As part of a governmental project this
responsibilisation of sovereignty hence enables the UN and the CTC in particular
to direct individual sltates on the basis of their sovereign membership of the
international society.
Conclusion
How does the threat of global terrorism aﬀect the nature and identity of sovereign
states? According to some, global terrorism has turned the sovereign state into a
‘zombie category’ as it forces states to cooperate internationally and to give up
their autonomy. Others have argued the opposite: global terrorism has reinforced
state sovereignty as it has legitimised the adoption of exceptional policies such as
preventative detention, anticipatory self-defence, or profiling of individuals. How-
ever, as this article has demonstrated, neither position is able to do justice to the
nuanced relation between sovereignty, law, and international politics. Both
positions assume that the relation between sovereignty and law – as well as the
relation between sovereignty and international cooperation – is to be regarded as
a zero-sum game: the more international cooperation and the more legal
regulation, the less room for state sovereignty and vice versa.
This article has developed an alternative approach to state sovereignty. It took
as its starting point the nexus between state sovereignty and international legal
responsibility. Historically, the idea of state sovereignty has always been connected
with the necessity to create disciplined subjects that know the relation between
autonomy and the responsibility to respect the rights of others. In that sense, there
is a strong continuity between 17th century attempts to contain warfare and 21st
century attempts to protect human rights via the ‘responsibility to protect’. Both
build on the idea that sovereignty and autonomy comes with responsibilities.
Having said that, the article shows that the rise of global threats such as
terrorism did have an impact on the way in which states are called to account in
international society. While traditional rules of state responsibility were essentially
backward-looking and confrontational, newer forms of accountability aim at
international cooperation for the protection of common interests. A prime example
is the CTC which aims at disciplining the legislative and executive machinery of the
states worldwide via mechanisms such as reporting, monitoring, providing assis-
tance, etc.
The CTC shapes the identities and behaviours of states via a particular
governmental project of responsibilisation of sovereignty. In this regard the shift
towards compliance regimes is illustrative of how law works as a governmental
technology; the accountability of state now not only refers to reparation of
wrongful behaviour in the past, but increasingly to taking precautions against an
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uncertain future. Governance then works as a global system of indirect, productive
power that operates to ‘guide, shape and foster’ specific types of states by setting
up standards of behaviour for good membership of the international community
(that is, as a republican project) with the ultimate aim the production of visible,
responsible, and predictable agents. Responsibilisation of sovereignty and the shift
to a legal compliance system thus fit within a global governance programme of
international scrutiny that is aimed at rendering states visible and predictable
actors of a normalised international arena, that exercise ‘their’ sovereignty in a
responsible and disciplined manner. Within the era of global terrorism and other
transnational risks, this responsibility is increasingly informed by taking precau-
tions in order to protect the common good of international society.70
70 Apart from specific threats (such as environmental, terrorist or financial risks), within liberal
governance ‘common good’ increasingly also includes more abstract notions of the protection of the
liberal world order and ‘our way of living’. See for instance Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: The
Politics of Securitization and Fear’, Alternatives, 30 (2005), pp. 55–80; and Oded Löwenheim,
‘Examing the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International “Governance Indicators”’, Third
World Quarterly, 29 (2008), pp. 255–74.
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